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INTENSIONAL EPISTEMIC WHOLES
A STUDY IN THE ONTOLOGY OF COLLECTIVITY
Alda MARI
1 Groups and kinds of wholes
In formal ontology1, for both concrete and abstract objects, the principle
of compositionality amounts to the statement that the constitution and
the representation of the whole is a function of the constitution and the
representation of the parts and the way they are assembled. In this paper
we analyze the notion of group that we formally treat as an abstract whole
whose parts are its members. Our investigation is based on natural lan-
guage data and in particular plural (the boys) and conjoined noun phrases
(John and Mary, the boy and the girl, the boys and the girls) in relation
with distributive or singular predication (i.e. predicates which only denote
singular atoms such as walk, be nice, be in some place...).
The notion of group2 has been extensively examined in the literature on
plurality in recent years. Major advances in this domain have shown that
formal ontology provides powerful means for understanding this notion3.
On the other hand, natural language data can lead us to revise the existing
models for part-whole structures and to elaborate new ones.
From the theoretical point of view, our aim is to question the principle
of compositionality in two respects. First, with respect to the parts, one
1Following the doctrine (Husserl, 1901), by ”formal ontology”, we refer to the study
of formal structures amongst objects and their parts.
2This notion is meant by various labels. The most popular are collection, set, whole,
integrated−whole, group atom. However, they profoundly differ in the way they capture
it. The first two roughly refer to groups as to sets without unity; the others emphasize
their monadic character. However, as we show in this paper, only a close inspection of
the theories into which they are defined can make justice of these differences.
3See in particular the works of (Lasersohn, 1995), (Moltmann, 1997), (Schwarzschild,
1996) and (Landman, 2000) explicitly applying formal ontology techniques to the analysis
of plurality.
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has to state clearly under what conditions two ontologically individuated
objects can be composed into a whole.4 Secondly, with respect to the whole,
one has to predict the nature of the object resulting from the composition
of some particular parts and a specific mode of assembling.
On the phenomenological side, we analyze a kind of collective inter-
pretation that we label as ”collectivity as dependence” and from now on
CODEP. This case poses a real challenge to existing theories of mereology
and ultimately to compositionality in the domain of abstract objects. Our
claim is that none of the foundational models for part-whole relations is
able to explain this phenomenon, and a new conception of whole has to be
worked out.
Let us introduce the phenomenon of CODEP by two examples. First of
all, to capture this notion, one has to distinguish it from that of ”juxtapo-
sition”. Consider the propositional content of the following sentence.
(1) John and Mary are walking along the beach
The scene described in (1) is such that there are two people waking side
by side along the same trajectory. This scene can be interpreted in two
ways:
(i) juxtaposition or genuine distributive interpretation - two people are
accidentally walking side by side, or
(ii) CODEP - two people are walking together (as a group) along the
same trajectory.
The first interpretation appeals to a minimal amount of composition,
which only consists in acknowledging that two people satisfy the same
description. The second interpretation appeals to a real process of compo-
sition which leads to see two people as forming a whole, or a group.
Secondly, to understand CODEP, one has to distinguish it form the
notion of ”collective responsibility”. Consider (2).
(2) The boys sing
This sentence is comparable to (1) in that the predication is singular.
Three interpretations are immediately available:
(i) juxtaposition or genuine distributive interpretation: each of the boys
sings, but they are not coordinating their singings (= (1i))5;
4The parts of a whole are not always seen as ontologically independent, especially with
respect to organisms and concrete objects, as Aristotle states in the De Anima, II-1,2. In
the case of group members, they certainly are.
5We discard here cases of distributions to collections in which subcollections of the set
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(ii) collectivity as dependence interpretation: each of the boys necessarily
sings, and they are all coordinating their singings with one another (=
(1ii));
(iii) collective responsibility interpretation: all of them are not necessarily
singing, but there is a collective responsibility, insofar as they are intended
to form a chorus.
The major difference between (ii) and (iii) is that under (iii) the boys are
expected to form an entity ”chorus”, while in (ii) it is by virtue of coordi-
nating their singings that they are conceived as a group. This group does
not necessarily have an independent status from the actual coordination of
singings. This points to the fact that the second interpretation is somehow
in between the two others: it requires that each of the boys sings (= (i)
and 6=(iii)), and that they do coordinate their singings (= (iii) but 6=(i)).
It is clear, then, that a proper mereological theory will have to predict,
first, under what conditions, ceteris paribus, CODEP interpretation is en-
hanced only in some but not all cases: provided that the scene under the
distributive and CODEP interpretations is exactly the same, one has to
explain by virtue of what interpretative process the second interpretation
raises (difference between interpretation (i) and (ii) of (1) and (2)). Sec-
ondly, the model will have to make explicit the nature of the whole that
results from this composition (difference between (ii) and (iii) of (2))6.
denoted by the plural NP are individuated as the proper loci for the application of the
property. In this case, for instance, the boys would be separated into two - or more -
subcollections and the property sing would be predicated of these subgroups. Once the
proper level of individuability has been chosen, the property is distributed in the same
way as in cases of distribution to genuine individuals. This procedure requires that a
huge amount of information be ”upgraded” contextually but seems to be explainable on
an extensional basis (Gillon, 1987; Schwarzschild, 1997) in the same way as distributivity
to non-group atoms. This phenomenon is to be correctly predicted by any model of
plurality. This would require a long and overly detailed explanation and is outside the
scope of this paper.
6The ”collective responsibility” interpretation seems difficult for (1), unless one admits
that in the case where one person brings the other one on her shoulders they can be
nonetheless said to be walking ”as a group”. This seems an unacceptable interpretation for
most of the speakers. Another case seems more triggering, that in which one of the people
is handicapped and moves on a wheel chair pushed by other person. One could nevertheless
respond that the wheel chair provides a way of moving and that this is not a collective
responsibility, but a CODEP interpretation according to which the two people have to
adjust their movements to one another and no entity ”group” pre-exists the mere event of
walking. It is then not unanimously recognized that ”collective responsibility” is a possible
interpretation for the predicate walk and because its availability would eventually be
added to CODEP interpretation, without replacing it, we prefer not to commit ourselves.
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There exist different conceptions of part-whole relations in the light of
which these data have been explained. In a very recent study, Meirav
(2003) has shown that they can be reduced to two foundational ways of
representing wholes, either as sums or as unities and that, when they are
conceived as unities, one can either explain their monadicity by the de-
pendence relations linking the parts7, or to consider them as ontological
primitives8.
In the first part of this paper, in section (2), we show that none of
these conceptions of wholes can explain the notion of CODEP. On the
phenomenological side, we show that two features characterize this case:
first, with respect to the parts, one can easily state that they are linked
by coherence - or dependence - relations. When walking ”together”, if one
of the people turns, the other will turn too, if one stops, the other will
stop too, and so on. Secondly, with respect to the nature of the whole,
one can equally easily state that this is neither the sum of its parts, nor a
unity existing above them: it does not exist a common walk out of the two
distinct walks of the two people. On the theoretical side, we consider in
turn models of wholes as sums and wholes as unity and analyze some formal
implementations. We argue that theories of wholes as sums cannot capture
the first feature, and that theories of wholes as unities would compel us
to accept the existence of a whole above the parts not fitting the case of
CODEP. Our conclusion is that another notion of whole is needed, one
that we will call wholes as networks.
In the second part of the paper, in section (3), we first present the
notion of whole as network informally, and then elaborate a formal account.
The definition of wholes as networks is designed to grasp the fact that,
under CODEP reading, the parts are seen as related via their properties,
and that this relation takes the form of an inferential constraint. From a
theoretical point of view, this corresponds to a counterfactual reasoning:
the cognitive agent makes predictions about the possible evolutions of the
entities, and, in the case where a covariation is foreseen, the entities are
conceived as entering a network. In the case where the entities are only
observed as covariating, and there is no counterfactual reasoning relating
them within a network, the distributive reading raises. As the result of the
inferential constraint by which the agent counterfactually relates properties
of individuated objects, the whole is nowhere else but in the network of
related entities.
7This conception goes back to Aristotle; seeMetaphysics, especially book Z Chs. 10,17;
book H Ch.6.
8This conception goes back to Plato; see Theaetetus 202e-205e, and particularly 203c-
205a.
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Under this account, the distinction between accidental vs. non-
accidental association is expressed in terms of ”observation” vs. ”predic-
tion” about the existence of a covariation of the properties of the parts.
As far as the parts are thought of as covariating, they can be thought of
as forming a whole. On its side, the whole is the resulting structure of this
covariation.
In section (4) we extend our model to cases of stative eventualities,
showing that the notion of dependence and property constraint is strictly
correlated to that of acquisition of information. We show that, whenever
the application of the constraint on properties does not bring new infor-
mation, the collective interpretation is suspended.
Our conclusion in a theoretical perspective (section (5)) is that the no-
tion of whole as network, going beyond extensionality, can conciliate, as a
middle term, two struggling notions: holism and compositionality.
2 Kinds of wholes
There exist a huge amount of literature about the notions of wholes as
sums and of wholes as unities9.
In this section, we recall the foundations of these two conceptions, con-
sider recent linguistic theories which rely on them, and show, in turn, why
none of these conceptions is appropriate to explain CODEP. We conclude
this section individuating the specificities of this case, which make it to
resist the existing explanations.
Wholes as sums
One way of conceiving wholes is as sums. Theories that subscribe to
this conception generally use operations of mereological sum or set union
over a domain of eventualities or individuals and recognize the axioms of
closure (3a) and uniqueness (3b).
(3a) Closure: A is closed under the operation ◦, i.e. for any a, b ∈ A
there is an element c ∈ A such that a ◦ b = c
9See, among many others, (Russell, 1903) for the contrasting distinctions between sums
and unities, called, respectively, ”aggregates” and ”unities”; see (Frege, 1884), (Goodman,
1951), (Les´niewski, 1916), (Lewis, 1986) for conception of wholes as sums; see (Nagel,
1952), (Simons, 1987), among many others, for theories of wholes as unities. The notion
of unity is strictly related and largely inspired by that of ”organic unity” (Husserl, 1901),
and shares its essential features with that of ”Gestalt” (Wertheimer, 1925).
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(3b) Uniqueness: If a = a′ and b = b′ then a ◦ b = a′ ◦ b′
On this view, groups are not considered as being of a different nature
from the members that compose them and, very importantly, sum and
composition are the very same operation10.
(4) u is a sum of x1, x2, ...xn =def for all y, y overlaps u if and only if y
overlaps one of the xs
(5) x1, x2, ...xn compose u =def u is a sum of x1, x2, ...xn
This means that there are no extra relations other than the sum of the
parts which compose a whole. It follows that wholes as sums are perfectly
coextensive with their parts11:
(6) Coextensive determination. Wholes are coextensively determined if
and only if for all u, for all v, for any x, for any y, if u is a whole which
corresponds to the x, v is a whole which corresponds to the y, then u is
identical to v only if the xs are coextensive with the ys.
Finally, the notion of sum brings with it the principle of universal
existence of sums:
(7) Universal existence of sums. Whenever we specify individuals, some
individual exists which is a sum of those individuals.
These axioms found Lasersohn’s (1995) definition of the togetherness
effect, which, if appropriate, should properly generate CODEP in all and
only the appropriate contexts. This definition is stated, in its original form
(Lasersohn 1995, p. 190), as in (8).
Let e, g, P , be event, group and property variables.  x1, x2, ...xn 
denotes the group consisting of x1, x2, ...xn.
(8) First condition for group formation. λP, e, g.g ∈ P (e)&∀e′ v
e(∃x(x ∈ P (e′) =⇒ P (e′) = P (e)))
This condition states that a group g is the set of people that satisfies
a property in each proper and improper part of the collective event. No
10(Meirav, 2003, p. 40)
11(Meirav, 2003, p. 224)
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other entity can be added in any subpart of e. So a group g is the minimal
set satisfying property P .
A corollary requirement is that the property does not have to be
distributed to the members constituting the group (Lasersohn, ibid.).
(9) Principle of no redistribution. A group g has a property P together
in eventuality e iff e has a smaller eventuality e′ as a part, such that g has
P in e′, and e′ does not have parts such that the members of g have P in
those parts.
Consider (10) and its interpretation (11):
(10) John and Mary are carrying the piano upstairs
(11) ∃E, ∃e1 v E[carry({j,m}, e1)]
According to the Davidsonian (Davidson, 1990) view of events endorsed
by Lasersohn (Lasersohn, 1995, p. 191), the assertion of the sentence
involves demonstrative reference to a particular eventuality (the collective
event (E)). This eventuality, in the situation we have described, consists in
one sub-event, e1, in which John and Mary are carrying the piano together.
The eventuality E in (10) is collective because there is a sub-event (e1)
in which the individuals do not satisfy the property separately.
In spite of conforming to the intuition of what a collective action is, this
account presents a major hurdle when one tries to extend it to the cases of
CODEP.
Representation (12) seems to be the only possible one for (1). However,
it cannot differentiate the distributive from CODEP reading.
(12) ∃E, ∃e1, e2, e3 v E[walk( {j}, {m} 
, e1), walk({j}, e2), walk({m}, e3)]
In the case of a singular predicate such as walk the collective event, if any,
can only be represented as ewalk =  {walkj}, {walkm} : by the nature
of the predicate, the property has to be distributed to the individuals, so
in ewalk John and Mary act both individually and as a group.
Moreover, this very same symbolization represents any set satisfying
condition (8). Consider the case where John and Mary are two persons
walking accidentally side by side, going exactly from point A to point B.
This set of people satisfies the definition of group given in (8) because it is
the minimal set which satisfies the property of walking in every proper and
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improper part of the event of going from A to B. It follows that (8) cannot
capture the difference between accidental and non-accidental association.
This is due to the principle of universal existence of sums (7) to which
classical extensional mereology subscribes. Even in the case of purely ac-
cidental association the individuals can be summed up in such a way that
there is no criterion to distinguish the distributive/accidental reading from
the collective/regular interpretation. This distinction appears fundamental
in the case of (1) where the distributive and the collective interpretations
can only be distinguished on the basis of the distinction between acciden-
tality vs. regularity. This distinction coincides with that between sum
and dependence relation, and thus an appropriate account of the collective
interpretation for singular predicates will have to integrate the notion of
dependence.
Wholes as unities
An alternative way of conceiving wholes is in terms of unity.
The basic assumption endorsed by this conception is that a whole is a
primitive, which has parts, without being dependent on the existence of
each of them. The principle of composition to which theories of wholes as
unit subscribe is not that of sum, but that of making up12:
(13) for any xs, for all ys, if the xs make up the ys then each of the xs
is a part of y
Very importantly, the notion of making up is such that the converse of
(13) does not hold: if some xs are part of y they do not necessarily make
up y.
Indeed, some basic principles grounding the notion of whole as sums are
not obeyed by theories of wholes as unties.
(14) Wholes as unities do not obey the principle of universal existence
of sums. Whenever some elements exist, a sum of these elements does not
necessarily make up a whole.
(15) Wholes as unities do not obey the principle of uniqueness. This is
because some elements can be put together in such a way that more than
12According to (Meirav, 2003) the notion of making up is to be understood in contrast
with that of ”coextensiveness”. Parts contribute to the existence of the whole, but this is
not coextensive with them.
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a whole can result.
(16) Wholes as unities do not obey the principle of coextensive deter-
mination. Wholes are not identical with the sum of their parts.
From the ontological point of view, (Landman, 1989b) and (Landman,
2000) claim that groups are plural entities seen under a certain perspective,
that is to say, monadic entities of a different nature from the plural entity
which underlies them. Once the existence of a unit has been recovered, the
accessibility to each of the members is blocked, i.e. the internal structure
of the unit becomes completely opaque.
In Landman’s ontology only atoms count as entities. Predicates differ
with respect to whether they take group atoms or individual atoms in
their denotation. Singular predicates (17) never denote group atoms but
only individual atoms. They can be pluralized13 (the ”*” indicates the
pluralization of the predicate).
(17) John and Mary walk
John unionsq Mary ∈ *WALK
John ∈ WALK & Mary ∈ WALK
→ ∀a ∈ John unionsqMary a ∈ WALK
Collective predicates (18) take group atoms and do not distribute the
property to the members (the ↑ indicates that the entities in its scope
form an indivisible atom):
(18) John and Mary meet
↑(John unionsq Mary) ∈ MEET
6→ ∀a ∈ John unionsqMary a ∈MEET
Some other predicates are ambiguous (19), and a type shifting operation
allows one to switch form the distributive to the collective reading (the σ
indicates that the plurality in its scope is maximal):
(19) The boys carry the piano individually −→ The boys carry the piano
together
σ(*BOYS) ∈ *CARRY −→ ↑ (σ(*BOYS) ∈ CARRY)
On the ontological level, the type shifting operation corresponds to a
change in perspective and can be translated by ”as a group”.
13See (Link, 1983).
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It is of major importance to state under what criteria one can shift the
interpretation from a sum reading to a group reading. Landman (2000)
provides the collectivity criterion (20):
(20) Collectivity criterion. The predication of a predicate to a plural
argument is collective iff the predication is a predication of a thematic
basic predicate to that plural argument, i.e. is a predication where the
plural argument fills a thematic role of the predicate.
In order to keep the theory coherent, Landman assumes that distributive
predication is not thematic. However, in some cases, the property can be
distributed down to each singular entity of the group, with the collectivity
criterion still satisfied. Consider (21):
(21) The journalists asked the president five questions
Landman (2000, pp. 171-172) uses the notion of collective responsibility
or team credit, guaranteeing that, even if each singular journalist asks the
president five questions, each question is attributed to the press body to
which each journalist belongs. In this case, the existence of a group has to
be presupposed.
This account raises a major difficulty when we try to apply it to CODEP
interpretation of (1) and (2).
According to the collectivity criterion, there are only two ways to model
this interpretation:
1. either one assumes that individuals forming a group must not satisfy
the property separately, i.e. singular predication can never be inter-
preted collectively, as Landman assumes at one point in his argument
(Landman, 2000, p. 148), in contrast with the fact that (21) can be
interpreted collectively;
2. or one has to retrieve the existence of a group in which the individu-
als are supposed to be involved from the context or from the lexical
information (which is the option finally subscribed by Landman for
(21)).
The first statement cannot be accepted if one recognizes that there is a
collective interpretation for (1):
(22) John and Mary are walking (as a group)
↑(John unionsq Mary) ∈ WALK and ∀a ∈ John unionsqMary a ∈ WALK
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The second statement would force the speaker and the hearer to assume
that John and Mary form a couple, for instance. This is, however, not
mandatory at all. The group does not necessarily pre-exist the eventuality
described in the scene. It is precisely ”in walking” that John and Mary do
form a group.
So we have either to admit that CODEP interpretation is incompatible
with singular predicates, or to abandon the collectivity criterion.
We assume that singular predication can give rise to CODEP reading and
that in these cases no group pre-exists the scene described by the sentence.
Consequently, it cannot be grounded on the collectivity criterion. Instead,
we agree, and we develop it in detail, that the notion of group is strictly
related to that of ”perspective”.
Unity by virtue of dependence
Theories of dependence with unity are an avatar of theories of wholes as
unity tout court. It is worth mentioning these theories as far as our purpose
is to work out the notion of dependence without unity. The basic claim
endorsed by theories of dependences with unity is that the whole is a unity
if and only if there exist some dependence relations among its parts: the
unity exists by virtue of the parts functioning together.
Nevertheless, the ontological claim seems still too compelling, if it is
mentioned - as in fact it is - to capture cases of CODEP interpretation.
According to Moltmann (1997), the way of reasoning goes as follows: the
parts are dependent, then they form a unity, and once the whole as unity
has come into existence, the access to the parts is blocked. A so-called
integrated-whole, the kind of whole at stake under CODEP interpretation,
is such that the parts do not keep an independent ontological existence.
This reasoning amounts to stating that a collective sentence necessarily
denotes a collective event such that the composing events are no longer
accessible. Formally this is given by the following condition (Moltmann,
1997, p. 56), where <s is a proper part relation in situation s:
(23) (Strict) Collective interpretation. For entities e and x, a verb f ,
and situations s and s′, f is interpreted collectively in s with respect to e,
x, s and s′ iff [f ]S(e,< x, s′ >) = 1, and there is no e′, e′ <s, such that for
some x′, x′ <s x and [f ]S(e′, < x′, s′ >) = 1
Likewise the other approaches of the notion of whole as unity, this def-
inition fails to capture the fact that dependent sub-events have to remain
both independent and accessible under CODEP: a common walk (1ii) exists
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nowhere but in the co-ordination of independent and accessible walks.
Neither sums nor unities
Let us sum up. There exist two conceptions of wholes at the light of which
one could explain notion of collectivity: wholes as sums, wholes as unities.
We have shown that none of these models captures the features which
characterize CODEP and, at this point, one seems to come to a certain
impasse.
Let us first recall the two characteristic features of CODEP.
(24) Elements for CODEP
1. a coherence relation which differentiates CODEP from pure accidental
association or distributive interpretation (e.g. two people walking as a
group have coordinated trajectories),
2. an access to the group members which differentiates CODEP from
”collective responsibility” interpretation (e.g. a walk independent of
the walk of each of the people does not exist).
Theories subscribing to the view of wholes as sums cannot make a dis-
tinction between two extensionally identical situations are thus too weak
to catch the first of the two features. Theories of wholes as unities are too
ontologically compelling to capture the second feature.
It is clear now that we are looking for a notion of whole stronger than
sum and weaker than monadicity. We claim that coherence relations are
necessary and sufficient. They guarantee that the collectivity reading is
possible by virtue of the existence of a network. There is, then, a third way
of looking at wholes: as networks. Individuals functioning together make
up a complex object without this abstract object existing per se. This is
precisely the case for a collective walk.
3 Wholes as networks
The notion of whole as network is nowadays largely studied in computer
science, particularly in theories of distributed systems and communicating
processes (see, in particular, (Barwise & Seligman, 1997; Milner 1999;
Stirling 2001)) and the model we are about to present is partly inspired
by Dretske’s theory of information flow (1981). Let us first introduce an
informal definition of wholes as networks.
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(25) Whole as Network. To a person with prior knowledge k, f
having property p carries the information that f ′ has property p′, in all
possible worlds compatible with k, if the person could legitimately infer
that f ′ has property p′ from f having property p. f and f ′ are seen then
as entering a network.
The core of the definition rests in the notion of counterfactuality and
property relation. From the point of view of the speaker, two entities
can enter a network if, for every possible world, their properties maintain
a certain relation. More precisely, two entities are considered to enter a
network as long as the speaker, given her previous knowledge, can foreseen
that their properties will entail each other in every possible world. In this
way, the entities are seen as mutually dependent via their properties. In
the case of a CODEP interpretation for the predicate walk, the agent can
foreseen that the people will coordinate their trajectories. If this prediction
cannot be made, and the association is only observed, the distributive
interpretation will be the only available one.
This notion of epistemic dependence has to be distinguished, on the one
hand, from that of juxtaposition, and, on the other hand, from that of
cause.
Two juxtaposed entities can form a collection, but not a unity nor a co-
herent whole. Juxtaposition is an extensional relation which links entities
that belong to a collection. This relation may rely on the fact that entities
share some common properties14. Nevertheless, the properties of each en-
tity exist totally independently of the properties of every other element in
the same collection.
On the other hand, epistemic dependency is weaker than cause, though
sharing very deep resemblances. If, one the one hand, cause can be under-
stood as ”bringing into existence”, there is another notion of cause in the
light of which we can understand dependence: that of covariation of prop-
erties (Lewis, 1973). In (1) for instance, the walk of one of the two people
exists independently of the walk of the other. However, under CODEP
interpretation, the properties of each of them constrain the properties of
the other: they do influence each other trajectories, for instance.
Crucially, like causality, epistemic dependence relies on types. Causality
is not random, but can be foreseen by virtue of the types of the events
involved. This is also the case for dependency. In a weaker way, though:
types are called into play when the cognitive agent epistemically links the
occurrences of two events. If the knowledge that one has about the properties
of one event entails the knowledge of the properties of another event, then
14See (Simons, 1997) and the notion of FF -relation.
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these two events are epistemically dependent. The informational feature is
crucial for dependence: for two people to be seen as walking collectively,
the property of the walk of one of them has to provide certain information
about the walk of the other.
It is reasonable to ask whether the non-accidental character is provided
by the existence of a constraint or by the modal notion of possible world.
Our answer is that both of these notions are needed. Given one point in
time, it is observationally impossible to make the difference between the
cases of accidental and non-accidental association and thus formalize the
situation by possibly constraining the descriptions. Under the collective
interpretation one foresees that the coordination will be kept, in such a
way that the notion of constraint and of maintenance of the constraint go
hand in hand15.
Implementation
In this section we work out the model for the notion of network, providing
an event-based account (Parsons, 1990). The model is articulated in
two domains: objects and descriptions. Individuals and eventualities are
objects (26):
(26) D domain of individuals; E domain of eventualities.
Eventualities are temporal entities of any kind, dynamic or stative.
As far as we are considering the propositional content of a sentence, we
need to analyze its constituents and assign to each of them the appropriate
task in the construction of the overall scene.
Singular NP denote singular objects, plural and conjoined NPs denote
sets of plural entities, without requiring any particular structure on this set.
(27) ‖ NP plural ‖ = {E ⊂ D | #E > 1}
Let, for a predicate f , be I the set of entities that occupy a certain
role (agent, patient, theme, ...) in the eventuality denoted by the predicate.
(28) I = {dR | ∃(e)(‖ f ‖ (e) & Role(e) = d))}
15This is corroborated by the fact that with achievements the collective interpretation is
lost by together which is, in these cases synonymous of atthesametime, and is impossible
for with, which requires that two entities influence one another. See (Jayez and Mari,
2004)
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Following Landman (2000), we assume that when a singular predicate
is combined with a plural argument, it is pluralized. So, if the predicate is
singular, there will be only one event, if the predicate is plural, there will
be as many events as participants irrespective of whether the interpretation
is collective or distributive. Typically, this is the case for the predicate
walk.
(29) states that for every individual in the set denoted by the plural
argument, there is an event, such that the predicate assigns the truth
value 1 to every pair < e, d > (indexed on R), if d occupies a certain role
in one of the plural events denoted by the pluralized predicate.
(29) ∀dR ∈ I(∃e(‖ f(e, dR) ‖= 1))
The second domain in the model is that of descriptions or types.
(30) Θ is the set of types
The introduction of types into the model allows us to integrate the
cognitive agent’s perspective on entities. The cognitive agent can assign a
description to any entity, minimally recognizing its location in space and
time. A classification (31) is the object’s type assignment.
(31) Classification. A classification is a triple (Objects, Types, |=),
where Objects is a set of objects, Types a set of categories or types, and
|= a relation between Objects and Types. If o ∈ Objects and σ ∈ Types,
o |= σ means that the o is of type σ.
Types can be assigned to either individuals or events. Types assigned
to events are called phases and they register the content of an event, i.e.
its past and future developments16.
For an event of walking, for instance, the phases register the trajectory
of the walk. For each point in time, part of the content of an event
is represented by its future developments. Assuming a branching time
representation (Penczek, 1995), given a certain point in the trajectory,
there exist a particular set of points that can continue the walk under
description at t′  t. This set is Markovianly determined, i.e. it does not
depend on the whole history of the events but only on the point in which
the system is at time t.
16They can be compared to object files for abstract objects (Pylyshyn, 2003), which can
be seen as a memory structure or a folder which stores information about a given object.
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(32) State space. s is a set of classifications for which each token is
assigned exactly one type. The state space S is complete if every type is
the type of some token.
Note that a state space is a situation, i.e. an agent-oriented structured
part of the reality. Very importantly, a state space is relative to a time t.
If one agrees that the agent assigns a description only to tracked objects
(Pylyshyn, 2003), a situation, in this perspective, is not generally a smaller
”world” compatible with the conceptual capacities of a cognitive agent
(Barwise & Perry, 1983). The agent focalizes her attention on some events
in which she is interested, and, by ”situation” we precisely mean all and
only the events that can be assigned a description. This is acknowledged
in our model by the fact that we can only use descriptions for the events
mentioned in the sentence. The content of these descriptions is retrieved
on the basis of contextual and encyclopedic knowledge.
A space state can evolve. Let (33) the space state which describes the
events of walking of John and Mary at t.
(33) s := { trajectoryτ |=s ej ; trajectoryτ ′ |=s em }
This state space can evolve in different manners such as those given in
(34).
(34) Possible evolutions of state space (33)
• s′1 := { trajectoryτ |=s′ ej ; trajectoryτ ′ |=s′ em }
• s′2 := { changetrajectoryτ |=s′ ej ; trajectoryτ ′ |=s′ em }
• s′3 := { trajectoryτ |=′s ej ; changetrajectoryτ ′ |=s′ em }
• s′4 := { stoptrajectoryτ |=s′ ej ; trajectoryτ ′ |=s′ em }
• s′5 := { trajectoryτ |=s′ ej ; stoptrajectoryτ ′ |=s′ em }
S ′ is the set of space states into which s can evolve, at time t′ immedi-
ately following t. 17
(35) S ′ = { s′ | ∀t, t′, S.t  t′ → (st ↪→ s′t′)
This is all we need to introduce in relation with particular events and
their descriptions. Let us consider now the formalization of the proper
17The ”immediateness” depends on the granularity one has chosen.
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notion of dependence. Its formal counterpart is that of constraint.
(36) Constraint. A constraint is a closed formula of the general form
Q((τ |= o) =⇒ ρ) where, Q is a series of quantifiers, τ a type, o an object
and ρ a well-formed formula.
Types correspond to observations and constraints are entailments among
observations: x having a certain property entails that y has a certain prop-
erty. From speaker’s perspective, observing that entity x has a certain
property means to infer that another entity in the domain has another
property. Constraints express then the fact that, if one observation can
be made, another observation can also be made. This fact amounts to the
acquisition of a piece of information.
At this point we can provide a formal condition for the wholes-as-
networks interpretation.
(37) Whole as network: condition for CODEP
‖ f sing(NP pl) ‖sit,tcoll = {ei,i∈I | ∀i ∈ I(‖ f ‖sit,t ei = 1 & ∀s′s↪→s′
(∀τ((τ |=s′ ei)⇒ ∀j,j∈I ∃τ ′(τ ′ |=s′ ej))))}
When it is applied to a plural NP , a singular predicate f sing is inter-
preted collectively in situation sit at time t if it denotes the set of events
indexed on individuals and thematic roles such that:
1. the predicate is true for any event involving an individual with respect
to a certain thematic role and,
2. for any possible state space s′ accessible from s for every description
for the eventuality involving any of the participants, this description
entails another description for any other eventuality involving any
other participant.
Note that we are not supposing that the collective interpretation calls
into play a collective event without accessibility to its subevents. Instead,
the collectivity is engendered by a constraint with scope upon the descrip-
tion of a set of events, and it exists nowhere but in the constraint relating
the entities via their descriptions.
The instantiation of the definition for the collective vs. distributive
reading of (1) will clarify our purpose.
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(38) CODEP interpretation for (1)
‖ John and Mary are walking along the beach ‖sit,tcoll ={e(agent{j}), e(agent{m}) | walk(ej) = 1 & walk(em) = 1 & ∀s′s↪→s′
∀trajectoryτ((trajectoryτ |=s′ ej) ⇐⇒ ∃trajectoryτ ′(trajectoryτ ′ |=s′
em))}
(39) Distributive interpretation for (1)
‖ John and Mary are walking along the beach ‖sit,tdistr ={e(agent{j}), e(agent{m}) | walk(ej) = 1 & walk(em) = 1 &
∃trajectoryτ∃s((trajectoryτ |=s ej) & ∃trajectoryτ ′(trajectoryτ ′ |=s em))}
CODEP interpretation (38) contrasts with the distributive one (39) in
two respects:
(i) in (39) there is no constraint;
(ii) in (39) the possible evolutions are not taken into account (the asso-
ciation is accidental and can only be captured step by step).
They resemble each other in that there is no independent collective event
for (38). These interpretations run as follows. Consider an S in which John
and Mary are walking. In S ′ at t′ one of following configurations can be
verified:
1. John keeps on walking/stops and so does Mary. There is a covariation
(Lewis, 1973), so they can be said to walk collectively in S.
2. John stops (or keeps on walking) and Mary keeps on walking (or stops).
There is no covariation so the formula is false at S.
When there is no covariation, John and Mary are viewed as walking
distributively. When a covariation is observed there are two possibilities.
On the one hand, John and Mary can be considered as walking ”as a
group”. The agent will foresee that the covariation will be maintained, and
thus constrains to one another the descriptions of the two events. On the
other hand, if the two walks are only observed as evolving in parallel and no
prediction is made, the parallelism is considered to be accidental. In other
terms, (37) is a rule of interpretation. It states that it is necessary that
under CODEP interpretation the agent foresee that two events covariate.
It does not exclude that a parallelism is observationally verified in the case
of an accidental association.
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4 Co-localization, states and definitory properties
At this point, we have considered only dynamic eventualities. Even though
our model seems to capture the specificities of the cases illustrated by (1),
its predictive power can be appreciated when applied to cases of stative
eventualities (more commonly, states) and co-localization in particular.
Note that these cases belong to the kind of collective interpretations that
we have been considering so far, for ”to be localized in some place l” is
trivially distributive.
It is very often the case that one can link two co-localized entities in
a non-accidental manner, as illustrated in (40). Some authors even claim
that any time two entities are co-localized they can be considered as
associated.18.
(40) The glasses and the decanters are in the cupboard
Under CODEP interpretation, the positions of the glasses and that of
the decanters are seen as related to one another. In wholes-as-networks
terms, we would suggest that a cognitive agent coordinates the two sets of
entities and recognizes that entities of the same type form a structure or
a network when they are in the same location. In inferential terms, this
amounts to state that one can retrieve the position of the glasses from that
of the decanters and vice versa.
However this is not a general rule of interpretation. One cannot collec-
tively interpret (41):
(41) The forest and the lake are at the top of the mountain
Our model explains this impossibility by the fact that the descriptions of
the entities are (epistemically) unrelated: the position of the lake (on the
top of a mountain) and that of the forest (on the top of the same mountain)
are seen as independent of one another. We have now to state why this is
the case.
Let us first emphasize that this is not due to the fact that these are
non-movable entities; the collective interpretation can in fact be unavail-
able in cases where the entities are movable:19
18Among others, see (Moltmann, 1997)).
19Of course, any entity in the world can be destroyed or removed in some way. However,
we can clearly make a difference between entities that (can) continuously change their
position and those which keep it for a considerable amount of time, generally exceeding a
human’s life.
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(42) John and President Clinton are in New York City at the moment
(42) cannot be interpreted collectively unless one considers that John
and President Clinton share a certain activity while in NYC, or that they
know each other. If John is in NYC independently of President Clinton,
the collective interpretation cannot be enhanced solely by virtue of the fact
that they share the same localization.
To understand why the constraint cannot be applied in these cases, one
has to consider the nature of the property, and to evaluate whether the
application of the constraint brings with it a gain of information. Recall,
in fact, that the constraint founding the notion of wholes as networks is
epistemic, and amounts to relate the knowledge that the cognitive agent has
about one entity, to the knowledge that she has about another entity, via
a counterfactual reasoning. This entailment brings the benefit of acquiring
a new knowledge about the structure relating the entities and, ultimately,
the entities themselves.
In this respect, for (41), it turns out that it would be totally informa-
tionless to apply a constraint between the properties of localization of the
lake and of the forest. It is in fact useless to epistemically link to one
another the positions of the lake and of the forest, while knowing them
independently. Once it is possible to know the localization of an entity in
a definitory manner, it is totally redundant to epistemically associate it to
the localization of another entity.20 In the light of the fact that individual-
level properties (i.e. definitory properties21) can never be involved in a
whole-as-network interpretation, the reader will easily conclude that this
is a general rule in the cognitive grammar.
In the case of (42), on the other hand, the co-localization is considered
to be irrelevant. It is informationally irrelevant to know the localization of
a President with respect to the localization of a citizen (and vice versa),
unless the agent previously knows that they share some activity, or that
they have a certain relation.
20Note that when the collective interpretation is explicitly instantiated (by using the
preposition with for instance), the epistemic dimension becomes central. Consider the
following discourse:
A: Of what lake are you talking about?
B: Of that with the forest nearby!
In this case, speaker A is looking for a particular lake. The fact of having a forest
nearby is relevant for the individuation.
21See (Carlson, 1977). It is not possible to interpret John and Mary are intelligent
collectively.
INTENSIONAL EPISTEMIC WHOLES 21
For both of these two cases, even though for opposite reasons, it is in-
formationally unworthy applying the constraint, and thus the collective
interpretation is not available.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the collective interpretation of distribu-
tive predicates that we have analyzed in the light of the notion of compo-
sitionality in a formal ontology framework. In this perspective, the scene
denoted by the sentences has been understood as a whole whose parts are
represented by the entities involved in the scene and explicitly mentioned
in the sentence. More specifically we have focused our attention on con-
joined and plural NPs and on their relation with singular (or distributive)
predication.
There exist different types of collective interpretations which involve
different types of relations between the parts and the whole, and which
appeal to different conceptions of the notion of whole. In compositionality
terms, this amounts to the standard statement that, given some individ-
uated objects which possibly can be brought together into a whole, there
exist different modes of assembling such that the nature of the whole is not
only function of the nature of its parts, but also of the particular strategy
of composition.
We have considered a set of data, characterized by the fact that every
member satisfies the same property. The mode of composition that we
have taken into account appeals to two specific factors: (i) there exist
some coherence or dependence relations among the members; (ii) these
dependence relations do not make up a unity.
Existing theories of part-whole structures cannot explain this particu-
lar type of collective interpretation that we have labeled as CODEP. As
Meirav (2003) has shown in a very recent study, all the theories of part-
whole structures elaborated in the course of the history, can be ranged
according to two different conceptions: wholes as sums and wholes as uni-
ties. Under the first account there exist no mode of composition other than
the juxtaposition of the entities. These can enter a unique class by virtue of
their similarity. Theories of wholes as sums are based on the axioms of uni-
versal existence of sums stating that, whenever some elements are given,
it is always possible to sum them together. When applied to CODEP
interpretation of singular predication, these theories fail to capture the es-
sential feature which distinguishes it from the distributive one: the entities
entertain a non-accidental relation and are not simply juxtaposed.
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Another option is to capture the notion of collectivity by that of whole
as unity. A unity is characterized by the fact that the parts of the whole are
no longer accessible, or, in other terms, they do not have an independent
existence from the whole, and, then, from one another. This ontological
claim is too strong for CODEP cases. If we consider two people following
together the same trajectory, it is clear that the association exists by virtue
of the coordination of their walks, and nowhere else.
Consequently, we have elaborated a different model to explain this type
of collective interpretation, that we have labeled ”wholes as networks”.
This model is based on the sole notion of dependence, which has to be
understood as an entailment between properties of entities trough possi-
ble worlds. The cognitive agent authorizes this entailment whenever she
foresees that the entities will covary with respect to some particular prop-
erties. This model abstracts from the entities themselves and considers the
predictions that the cognitive agent will make about the maintenance of a
covariation between their properties trough possible worlds.
The reason to introduce an intensional relation is that the record of
mere extensional events is not sufficient to distinguish a pure accidental
from the regular association. In this respect, the difference between the
distributive and the collective reading is formulated as a difference between
mere observation and prediction.
Crucially, our account is based on the notion of information flow and
gain of information. Whenever the agent associates two entities via their
properties by a counterfactual reasoning, she is gaining information about
one entity from what she knows of the other.
This model seems not only appropriate to capture the specificities of the
particular type of collective interpretation in case of dynamic eventualities,
but it also provides interesting predictions about the nature of the proper-
ties that can be involved in a whole-as-network interpretation. Definitory
properties are epistemic-constraint-proof, as far as there would be no extra
information added by relating to one another entities that can be known
by one of their definitory properties steadily. Triggering data about co-
localization in particular can be explained in the light of this statement.
Co-localization is not sufficient to enhance the collective interpretation, as
often argued. If some entities can be localized in an absolute way, it is infor-
mationless to relativize their position to that of another entity. Whenever
the wholes-as-networks interpretation rises, the agent has to make sure she
can gain some information.
It is highly predictable that this general pattern of reasoning is instan-
tiated in the grammar by specific constructions and lexical items. Let us
mention the adverbial together, the preposition with and the expressions of
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reciprocity. A detailed study of these constructions is outside the scope of
this work, whose aim was restricted to the introduction and the elaboration
of a different manner of conceiving wholes, which, leaving extensionality far
behind and adding intensionality with the topological notion of state space
and epistemic constraint, opens a middle way between the set theoretic
notion of sum and holism.
